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Abstract
This paper determines the distributional effects of international
outsourcing in a two sector Heckscher-Ohlin type model. It is
shown that the factor-biased and the sector-biased impact of
international outsourcing discussed in the literature can be seen
as special cases of the more general characterization presented in
this paper. Concerning the welfare implications of international
outsourcing, the main finding is that a Pareto-improvement cannot
be excluded from a theoretical point of view.
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After trade and skill-biased technological change, fragmentation and out-
sourcing have been put forward as explanations for the rising wage di¤erential
between skilled and unskilled labor (cf. Feenstra and Hanson, 1996a, 1996b;
Slaughter, 2000). Moving the production of those intermediate inputs, which
substitue the relatively scarce factor of the economy to foreign countries in
which this factor is cheap depresses demand for the scarce factor in the source
country. This conclusion has been challenged by Arndt (1997a). The intu-
itively appealing idea, that labor of an industiralized capital rich country
is set free if …rms have access to cheap foreign labor, may be misleading in
the general equilibrium for the following reason. The mere fact that …rms
have access to cheap labor makes them relatively more competitive so that
they expand production. According to the analysis of Arndt, the postitive
employment e¤ect resulting from the expansion of production outweighs the
negative e¤ect of substituting home labor by foreign labor. This leads to the
somewhat surprising conclusion that outsourcing is bene…cial for (unskilled)
home labor, not harmful. However, as Egger and Egger (2001) showed in
their analysis the conclusion of Arndt is not a general result but based on
special assumptions, which have to be assessed empirically.1
It is the purpose of this study to give a full characterization of the im-
pact of outsourcing on factor returns in the general equilibrium of an open
economy which has no in‡uence on prices in the world market. The results
1Compare also the discussion in Arndt (1997b), which makes clear that the factor
market implications of international outsourcing depend on the relative factor intensities
of the di¤erent sectors in a diversi…ed equilibrium.
2are based on the general insight of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem that fac-
tor prices are determined by the goods prices and the employed technologies
alone, whereas a change in factor endowments is irrelevant as long as the
economy is in a diversi…cation equilibrium. Therefore, in an economy in
which goods prices are given by the world market, outsourcing can only af-
fect the distribution of factor incomes insofar the technology of production
is changed by the outsourcing …rms. Of course, things change if a specializa-
tion equilibrium is reached. In this case, factor endowments have a crucial
role for the determination of factor prices and the distributional e¤ects of
international outsourcing are more subtle, as pointed out by our analysis.
We show …rst, that for an individual …rm economical access to interna-
tional outsourcing is equivalent to employing a new production technique.
Thereafter, we determine the general equilibrium of a two sector economy in
which the …rms of one sector can choose between a traditional way of pro-
duction and a new method based on international outsourcing. After having
characterized factor intensities in the equilibrium with and without inter-
national outsourcing, respectively, we compare the equilibrium prices of the
two primary factors resulting under outsourcing with those in an economy in
which outsourcing is not feasible. The welfare implications of international
outsourcing are also derived. The …nal step of our analysis is to discuss our
main …ndings and to compare them to the literature. A short conclusion
completes the paper.
32 Cross Border Outsourcing in a 2x2 Produc-
tion Model
2.1 De…nitions and Assumptions
Although in the literature the terms fragmentation and outsourcing are some-
times used synonymously there is an importantdi¤erence between the twono-
tions. Whereas fragmentation means the splitting up of a production process
independent of whether this occurs within or across …rms or plants, the lat-
ter one contains not only the splitting up but also the spatial separation of
production. Denote by Q the set of vectors of available primary factors of
production and let X = x1 £ ::: £ xn be the set of possible intermediate
goods.2 Then the following de…nition characterizes fragmentation.
De…nition 1 (Fragmentation) Let f (q), q 2 Q, and x(q1;:::;qn) = (x1(q1),
x2(q2), ..., xn (qn)), q1;:::;qn 2 Q, be production functions. Then, inter-
mediate production processes x are said to be a fragmentation of integrated
production f if there exists a ”residual” technology g(q0;x), such that for all
q 2 Q








for some q0;q1;:::;qn 2 Q.
2We use the term intermediate goods in a broad sense, including services as well as
products.
4Residual technology g may contain production processes, …nal assem-
bly or simply consist of organizational and managerial activities necessary
for coordinating fragmentation. Using this characterization the de…nition of
outsourcing directly follows.
De…nition 2 (Outsourcing) Let x be a fragmentation of f with residual tech-
nology g. Then, outsourcing of intermediate j means that g is employed at
the same location as f whereas xj (qj) is spatially seperated. We say that in-
termediate j is internationally outsourced if xj (qj) is located abroad, whereas
residual production g remains located at home.
For our analysis of international outsourcing the following assumptions
are made. First, we consider a small economy, so that world market prices p
are given. Second, markets are perfectly competitive and factors are perfectly
mobile between sectors but immobile across borders. Third, we focus on the
familiar 2x2 production framework, with two primary factors of production,
say q = (Y;Z), and two sectors of production, i = 1;2. Let Y and Z be
the respective total endowments of home and let Si denote the output of
sector i. Fourth, all …rms within one sector are identical. Fifth, production
functions are strictly increasing, strictly concave, linearly homogeneous and
di¤erentiable. Sixth, we do refrain from national outsourcing and within-…rm
fragmentation and focus on international outsourcing only. Seventh, among
the outsourcing …rms, we restrict the analysis to two component stages, that
means that only one intermediate x(¢) is considered.3 In sum, our assump-






3If there are more than one component outsourced to foreign, x(¢) summarizes all those
components.






tation. Subscripts f and g refer to factor use in integrated and fragmented
modes of production, respectively. The asterisk indicates levels of foreign
factor inputs.









ZZi¤ be production costs in
sector i without and with international outsourcing, respectively. wY and wZ
are fator prices of Y and Z in home and w¤
Y and w¤
Z are the respective factor
prices in foreign. Denote by ci
f (wY ;wZ) the minimal unit costs of production
in sector i without international outsourcing. Moreover, let ki
f (wY ;wZ) be
the optimal factor intensity Y i
f=Zi
f in sector i under integrated production.
Cost minimization under outsourcing can be seperated into two subproblems:
cost-minimal production of intermediate xi and cost-minimal combination of
xi and home-supplied factor inputs X, Y . Let ci
x(w¤
Y ;w¤
Z) be the minimal
unit costs of production of intermediate xi in foreign. Moreover, let, for pro-








x) be the cost-minimal input coe¢cients of home factors Y , Z
and intermediate xi, respectively. Then, minimal unit costs of production in
























Z and thus ci¤
x are exogenously given for
the considered small economy.















for each sector i which is active at home. ci
f and ci
g have standard proper-
ties. They are linear-homogeneous in their arguments and the isocost curves




f=const is given by ki
f and the slope ¡
dwZ
dwYjci




























Finally, the sign of @ki
g=@ci¤
x is ambiguous. It depends on whether the
outsourced intermediate substitutes factor Y or factor Z.














x ) · pi. International outsourcing is cost saving if
c
i









(Note that access to cost-saving international outsourcing is equivalent to
7ci¤
x < ci
x for some threshold ci
x.4)
Since it can easily be shown that if international outsourcing is not cost
saving, the economical access to international outsourcing does not have any
impact on factor prices, we do ignore this case in the following analysis.
Concerning the factor intensity of the outsourced component, the follow-
ing de…nition characterizes the type (with respect to its intensity) of inter-
national outsourcing.
De…nition 4 Let wY ;wZ be a pair of factor prices ful…lling ci
g (wY ;wZ;ci¤
x ) =












We also speak of Z-outsourcing (Y -outsourcing, respectively) at wY ;wZ. As
benchmark case we have neutral outsourcing if ki
g (wY ;wZ;ci¤
x ) = ki
f (wY ;wZ).
2.2 Factor Intensities
We make the usual assumption that there is no factor intensity reversal un-
der integrated production. Formally, if ki
f (wY ;wZ) ? k
¡i














f depend only on relative factor prices not on their level.)
Outsourcing means that in one of the two sectors j 2 fi;¡ig a new technol-
ogy is available. Comparisons between integrated and outsourcing modes of
4 ci
x is implicitly de…ned by the equation ci









x > 0, ci









8production can only be made if outsourcing and integrated technologies can
be ranked according to their factor intensities. However, it is not necessary
to rank kj
g (wY ;wZ;cj¤
x ) relative to ki
f (wY ;wZ) and k
¡i
f (wY;wZ) globally.5
It is su¢cient to assume that no factor intensity reversal occurs over a cer-




x ) = pjª
be
the subset of factor prices de…ned by the zero pro…t condition in the out-
sourcing sector j. We assume that there is no factor intensity reversal over
Wj; i.e.: If ki
f (wY ;wZ) ? kj
g (wY ;wZ;cj¤








x ) for any (w0
Y;w0
Z) 2 W j, i = 1;2.
An immediate implication of our assumption about factor intensity rank-
ings is that de…nition 4 of the factor-bias of outsourcing describes a global
property in the subset Wi, where sector i is the outsourcing sector. If out-
sourcing of sector i substitutes factor Z (factor Y ) at factor prices (wY ;wZ) 2
Wi; it substitutes factor Z (factor Y ) at any other factor prices (wY;wZ) 2
Wi as well.
2.3 Equilibria
Before anaylsing the distributional e¤ects of international outsourcing we
have to identify the possible equilibria without and with international out-
sourcing (refered to as non-outsourcing and outsourcing equilibria, respec-
tively). The possible equilibria without international outsourcing are given
5Note that kj
g may change with proportional variations in wY ;wZ since kj
g is also
a function of cj¤
x . Only if the outsourcing technology is seperable, in the sense that
gj ¡
Y;Z;xj¢
= e gj ¡
hj (Y;Z);xj¢
for some linear-homogenous e gj;hj, kj
g depends only on
relative factor prices wY ;wZ.
9by fact 1.
Fact 1 Let k ´ Y =Z. Moreover, let wY and wZ be de…ned by ci
f (wY;wZ) =
pi, for i = 1, 2 and ! = wY =wZ. Assume that i denotes the Y -intensive
sector, i.e. ki
f (wY;wZ) > k
¡i
f (wY ;wZ), then:
(i) The non-outsourcing equilibrium is diversi…ed if and only if at factor
prices wY and wZ, ki
f (wY ;wZ) > k > k
¡i
f (wY ;wZ). In this case equilibrium
factor rewards are given by w
f
Y = wY and w
f
Z = wZ.
(ii) The non-outsourcing equilibrium is specialized on the Z-intensive sec-
tor ¡i if and only if k
¡i



























(iii) The non-outsourcing equilibrium is specialized on the Y -intensive sector i
if and only if ki

























f (wY;wZ) = k
¡i
f (wY ;wZ), which would imply that technolo-
gies for integrated production in both sectors are described by the same factor
intensities, is ignored. Figure 1 represents for Y =Z = k a situation where
a diversi…ed equilibrium exists before …rms have access to international out-

























, we have an equilibrium (point C) specialized
on the Z-intensive sector.
>Figure 1<
10All equilibria which are possible after …rms in sector i have accesss to
international outsourcing are given by fact 2.
Fact 2 Let k ´ Y =Z. Let wY and wZ be determined by the equations
ci
g (wY ;wZ;ci¤
x ) = pi and c
¡i
f (wY ;wZ) = p¡i and assume that only …rms
in sector i have economical access to cost saving international outsourcing,
then:
(i) The outsourcing equilibrium is diversi…ed (with both sectors i and ¡i ac-
tive) if at factor prices wY ;wZ either ki
g (wY ;wZ;ci¤
x ) > k > k
¡i
f (wY ;wZ) or
ki
g (wY;wZ;ci¤
x ) < k < k
¡i
f (wY ;wZ). In a diversi…ed outsourcing equilibrium
factor prices are given by w
g
Y = wY and w
g
Z = wZ.
(ii) The outsourcing equilibrium is specialized on sector i if at factor prices
wY ;wZ either ki
g (wY;wZ;ci¤
x ) < k and k
¡i





f (wY;wZ) > k. (The case ki
g (wY ;wZ;ci¤
x ) = k
¡i
f (wY;wZ) = k is
consistent with diversi…cation as well as specialization.)
(iii) If the outsourcing equilibrium is specialized on sector i, then both the in-
tegrated (f) and the outsourcing (g) technology are in use if and only if there
exist factor prices e wY ; e wZ, for which ci
g (e wY; e wZ;ci¤
x ) = pi, ci
f (e wY; e wZ) = pi
and ki
g (e wY; e wZ;ci¤
x ) < k < ki
f (e wY; e wZ) or ki
g (e wY ; e wZ;ci¤
x ) > k > ki
f (e wY ; e wZ).
In this case equilibrium wages are given by w
g
Y = e wY and w
g
Z = e wZ. Oth-


















x ) = k.
Figure 2 shows a diversi…ed equilibrium before and after …rms of the Y -
intensive sector get access to cost saving international outsourcing. The cost
























outward shift of the (wY;wZ)-combinations at which the unit production
costs of the Y -intensive sector equal the given goods price pi. Note as a











x ) = pi)
in the Y -intensive sector if international outsourcing is cost saving and the
outsourcing equilibrium is diversi…ed.6
>Figure 2<
2.4 Distributional E¤ects of International Outsourcing
The aim of this paper is to identify the distributional e¤ects of international
outsourcing, i.e. its impact on the returns to the production factors in home.
The following theorems give a complete characterization of this impact for
diversi…ed as well as specialized equilibria.
Theorem 1 If both the non-outsourcing and the outsourcing equilibrium are
diversi…ed, then the real return to the factor used intensively in the outsourc-
ing sector increases whereas the real return to the other factor decreases.
Proof. See the appendix.
As an immediate consequence of theorem 1 we get the following.



















= pi. In this case …rms in
the Y -intensive sector are indi¤erent between using technology fi and technology gi and
factor prices in the outsourcing equilibrium are equivalent to those in the non-outsourcing
equilibrium.
12Corollary 1 If both the non-outsourcing and the outsourcing equilibrium are
diversi…ed, then outsourcing does not change the ranking of sectors according














Proof. See the appendix.
The next theorem characterizes the distributional consequences if out-
sourcing reduces the number of production sectors active in the economy.
Note that access to cost-saving international outsourcing can lead to an
elimination of the non-outsourcing sector, but not to an elimination of the
outsourcing sector.
Theorem 2 If international outsourcing leads from a diversi…ed non-outsour-
cing equilibrium to an outsourcing equilibrium specialized on the outsourcing
sector i, then the following holds.
(i) If outsourcing substitutes the factor which is intensively used in the non-
outsourcing sector ¡i, then only technology g is in use in the outsourcing
equilibrium and the real return to the factor used intensively in sector i in-
creases, whereas the impact on the real return to the other factor is ambigu-
ous.
(ii) If outsourcing substitutes the factor intensively used in the outsourcing
sector i, then the real return to this factor decreases and the real return to
the other factor increases, if both the integrated (f)and the outsourcing (g)
technology are in use in sector i, whereas the impact on both factor returns is
ambiguous if only the outsourcing technology survives. Nevertheless, at least
one factor gains.
13Proof. See the appendix
Table 1 in the appendix summarizes the distributional e¤ects of inter-
national outsourcing in a concise way. In addition to the real factor price
e¤ects given by theorems 1 and 2 it also shows the impact of international
outsourcing on relative factor prices.
Implications of international outsourcing for real returns to the primary
factors can also be derived if the non-outsourcing equilibrium is specialized.
Theorem 3 states the distributional consequences if access to cost-saving out-
sourcing leads to an increase in the number of active sectors in the economy so
that the outsourcing equilibrium is diversi…ed although the non-outsourcing
equilibrium was not. Theorem 4 considers the case that the economy is
specialized without and with international outsourcing, where outsourcing
opportunities may change the nature of specialization. Of course, the spe-
cialization in the outsourcing equilibrium can only be on the outsourcing
sector. Both theorem 3 and theorem 4 focus on the main di¤erences to the
factor price implications given by theroems 1 and 2. (See tables 2 and 3 in
the appendix for a complete listing of real and relative factor price e¤ects if
the non-outsourcing equilibrium was specialized.)
In the following, a factor is said to be intensively used in sector i if at given
relative factor prices cost-minimization implies a relatively more intensive use
of the factor under the integrated technology fi than under the integrated
technology f¡i of the other sector. Whether the respective sector is active
or not does not matter for this notion. Also the notion of Y -outsourcing
and Z-outsourcing, according to de…nition 4, is independent of whether the
respective sector was active in the non-outsourcing equilibrium.
14Theorem 3 If international outsourcing leads from a specialized non-outsour-
cing equilibrium to a diversi…ed outsourcing equilibrium, the impacts of outsour-
cing on factor prices are the same as in theorem 1 except for one case. If the
outsourcing sector was inactive in the non-outsourcing equilibrium and out-
sourcing substitutes the factor which is intensively used in this sector, then
the impact on both factor returns is ambiguous. Nevertheless, one factor
gains and one factor loses.
Proof. See the appendix.
Theorem 4 If both the non-outsourcing and the outsourcing equilibrium are
specialized, then the following holds:
(i) If the outsourcing sector i was inactive in the non-outsourcing equilib-
rium, the impacts on factor prices are the same as in theorem 2.
(ii) If the outsourcing sector i was active in the non-outsourcing equilibrium
the impacts on factor prices are the same as in theorem 2 apart from the fol-
lowing exemptions: If outsourcing substitutes the factor which is intensively
used in the non-outsourcing sector ¡i then both technologies f and g may be
in use in the outsourcing equilibrium. In this case the e¤ect on the real return
to the factor intensively used in sector ¡i is no longer ambiguous (as in the-
orem 2) but de…nitely negative. The real return to the other factor increases.
If outsourcing substitutes the factor intensively used in the outsourcing sector
i and only technology g is in use in the outsourcing equilibrium, then the ef-
fect on the real return to the factor intensively used in sector ¡i is no longer
ambiguous but de…nitely positive. The real return to the other factor remains
ambiguous (as in theorem 2).
15Proof. See the appendix.
Concerning the welfare e¤ects of international outsourcing, the impacts
on factor prices derived above directly lead to the following assessment.
Theorem 5 In a 2x2 production framework with linear homogeneous tech-
nologies, no factor intensity reversal and given commodity prices, economical
access to cost saving international outsourcing does not lead to a Pareto-
improvement if at least in one sector the integrated technology is used in the
outsourcing equilibrium. If integrated technologies are totally subsituted by
outsourcing technologies both factors may possibly gain without redistribu-
tional measures.
Proof. Directly follows from theorems 1-4.
3 Discussion
Modellinginternational outsourcing as cost-savingtechnological change which
allows …rms to import intermediate goods produced at lower costs abroad
makes it possible to analyse the e¤ects of international outsourcing in a uni-
form framework despite the many di¤erent forms that international outsourc-
ing may have. The speci…c form of international outsourcing chosen by a …rm
depends on the set of intermediate inputs which can be produced abroad in
a cost-saving way. In industrialized countries international outsourcing may
substitute (unskilled) labor which can be employed relatively cheap in de-
veloping countries. However, it might well be the case that skill-intensive
intermediate goods are outsourced to countries which are well-endowed with
skilled labor.
16In the discussion of the distributional e¤ects of international outsourc-
ing, in terms of relative or real factor returns the literature distinguishes
between factor-biased and sector-biased impacts of international outsourcing
(compare Kohler, 2001). Whereas the former is analysed within one sector
models (compare Feenstra and Hanson, 1996b), the analysis in a two sector
Heckscher-Ohlin framework shows that the factor-bias of international out-
sourcing, i.e. the factor intensity of the outsourced intermediate input, is of
no interest as long as diversi…ed equilibria are considered. Rather, the rele-
vant question is in which sector outsourcing occurs (compare Arndt, 1997a,
1997b). For instance if the skill-intensive sector is engaged in international
outsourcing, then skilled labor gains and the real wage of unskilled labor
declines. This is in line with the usual worries that the burden of interna-
tional outsourcing is born by unskilled workers. In contrast, if …rms in the
relatively less skill-intensive sector outsource intermediate production, the
unskilled labor gains whereas wages of skilled workers go down. This is the
case by which Arndt (1997a) challenged the conventional wisdom that (un-
skilled) labor is the loser of outsourcing. However, as Kohler (2001) points
out the factor-biased impact of international outsourcing arises in a two sector
model if a Ricardo-Viner framework is chosen instead of a Heckscher-Ohlin
model.
Our general characterization of international outsourcing in a two sector
Heckscher-Ohlin type model allows for both the sector-biased and the factor-
biased impact of international outsourcing. In particular, as theorem 1 makes
clear, international outsourcing within one sector has a sector-biased impact
on factor returns if both the non-outsourcing and the outsourcing equilibrium
17are diversi…ed. In contrast, if the outsourcing equilibrium is specialized, a
factor-biased impact of international outsourcing may arise. But as theorems
2-4 and tables 1-3 make clear the distinction between sector and factor-bias
alone is not su¢cient to give a comprehensive picture of the distributional
e¤ects that international outsourcing can have.
The following section lists the main extensions to the scienti…c discus-
sion on the factor price implications of international outsourcing following
from the general characterization given in this paper. First, international
outsourcing has not to be complete. This means that if cost-saving inter-
national outsourcing becomes economically attractive within one sector, it
may nonehteless pay for some …rms in this sector to retain the integrated
mode of production also in the outsourcing equilibrium. Thus, the integrated
technology may survive along with the outsourcing technology. Second, in-
ternational outsourcing may revive an inactive sector. Then, the factor price
implications depend on the number of sectors active in the outsourcing equi-
libirum and the technologies used in these sectors. This is an interesting case
considering for example the textile industry which after having migrated to
developing countries mainly in Asia has been reactivated in the industrialized
world in the last few years, using fragmentation and international outsourcing
opportunities. Finally, and perhaps most important for the political discus-
sion, international outsourcing may yield a Pareto-improvement. However,
as pointed out by theorem 5 a Pareto-improvement induced by international
outsourcing is only possible if integrated technologies are totally substituted
by outsourcing technologies. In our two sector model with only one sec-
tor having access to international outsourcing, a Pareto-improvement is only
18possible if the outsourcing equilibrium is specialized on the outsourcing sec-
tor with only the outsourcing technology in use in the surviving sector. In
general, the outsourcing equilibrium has not to be specialized for a Pareto-
improving impact of international outsourcing to occur. For instance, if both
sectors are engaged in international outsourcing and outsourcing is complete,
i.e. if integrated technologies are totally substituted by outsourcing technolo-
gies, the diversi…ed outsourcing equilibrium may also be Pareto-superior to
the (diversi…ed) non-outsourcing equilibrium.
The assumptions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model are of course crucial for
our conclusions. In reality, adjustment costs may cause losers at least in
the short run. Moreover, the analysis above does not incorporate any …xed
costs of international outsourcing, which may yield a welfare decline in the
outsourcing economy (compare Kohler, 2001). Finally, the constant price
assumption makes our analysis suitable for small open economies only.
4 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to show that the impact of international outsourc-
ing on real and relative factor prices depends critically on di¤erent factors
determining the concrete form of international outsourcing (i.e. the number
of sectors being active, the factor intensities of the sectors and the out-
sourced component, etc.). In extension to the discussion in the literature,
it was shown that the so called factor-biased and sector-biased impacts of
international outsourcing are not comprehensive but may rather be seen as
special cases of a more general characterization of international outsourcing
19presented in this paper.
Concerningthe fears that mainly unskilled workers inindustrialized econo-
mies will be the losers of international outsourcing, the analysis in this paper
showed that at least from a theoretical point of view it may also be the skilled
workers who lose from outsourcing despite the empirical evidence that mainly
less skill-intensive parts of production are the object of outsourcing decisions
of globalized …rms. Although so far neglected in the literature, international
outsourcing may as well yield a Pareto-improvement making all workers bet-
ter o¤. However, adjustment costs which are relevant at least in the short
run are ignored in this assessment.
Since theoretical predictions for the distributional e¤ects of international
outsourcing are ambiguous, empirical assessments are necessary to identify
the winners and the losers of international outsourcing, and to see if there
are losers at all.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1






























20according to fact 1. Assume that (only) …rms in sector i have economical

























































Z) cannot be an equilibrium with cost-saving out-
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and single crossing of the unit isocost curves























Z. According to (A3), this cannot be an equilibrium with outsourc-









Z) must hold in the diversi…ed outsourcing equlibrium. ¥




















in the non-outsourcing equi-








Z in the diversi…ed
















Z) = p¡i, ac-
cording to (A2) and (A4). Strict convexity of c
¡i






























x ) > k in equilibrium. ¥
Proof of Theorem 2
If only …rms in sector i have economical access to international outsourcing
and, in addition, the outsourcing equilibriumis specialized on the outsourcing
































if in the specialized outsourcing equilibrium only outsourcing technology
g is in use. If both the integrated and the outsourcing technology are in use




























(A5)-(A8) directly follow from fact 2.
Proof of part (i): Suppose without loss of generality that …rms of the Y -































ing to de…nition 4 of Z-outsourcing and the assumption of no factor intensity



























































. Note next, that if the Y -intensive sec-
tor has economical access to international Z-outsourcing we cannot have a
specialized outsourcing equilibrium with both technologies f and g in use.
To see this assume that both technologies (f) and (g) would be in use in






























> k, the assumption of no factor inten-
sity reversal (along the ci
g (wY ;wZ;ci¤





















if both f and g are in use in the outsourcing equilibrium. But this is im-



















and the single crossing of the

























= p¡i, which is not consistent with an
equilibrium specialized on sector i. In sum, only the outsourcing technol-
ogy is in use in the specialized outsourcing equilibrium in which …rms in
the Y -intensive sector have economical access to cost-saving international
Z-outsourcing. Outsourcing equilibrium factor prices are therefore given by
(A5) and (A6). Remember that ¡
dwZ
dwYjci



























> k. Moreover, the fact that sector ¡i is no













































Z cannot be an equilibrium under cost-saving out-
sourcing. Suppose without loss of generality that …rms of the Y -intensive























for all (wY;wZ) 2 W i, since Y -outsourcing is assumed. Consider …rst the









Z cannot be an eqilibrium since, according


































and the single crossing of the unit isocost















Z) > p¡i and are therefore consistent with a specialized out-












x ) must hold because of
(A11). If only the outsourcing technology (g) is in use in the outsourcing
equilibrium, factor prices in the outsourcing equilibrium are given by (A5)




















the non-outsourcing diversi…cation equilibrium and that (A11) holds in the




















R k. Thus, there is no
restriction on wY ;wZ, like (A9) in part (i). Nonetheless, restriction (A10)
still holds. It says that at least one factor gains from outsourcing. ¥
A Diversi…ed Non-outsourcing Equilibrium and Factor
Price Implications of International Outsourcing
The following table summarizes the real and relative factor price implications
if the non-outsourcing equilibrium is diversi…ed. Without loss of generality
we assume that outsourcing occurs within the Y -intensive sector.
>Table 1<
In this matrix ”+” and ”¡” mean that international outsourcing has a
positive or negative impact on the respective real or relative factor price. A
”°” indicates that there is no change.
Proof of Theorem 3
In the proof of theorem 3, we focus on those outcomes which are di¤erent
from theorem 1. The proof of the other results is similar to the proof of

















25according to fact 1. Consider that (only) …rms in sector i have econom-





Z in the diversi…ed outsouring equilibirum are determined by (A3)







































































R k, so that there is no restriction









Z lie on the same unit isocost curve c
¡i
f , according to (A2) and








Z or one factor wins and
the other loses. ¥
Proof of Theorem 4
We prove only those outcomes (in part (ii)) which are di¤erent from theo-
rem 2. We assume that the non-outsourcing equilibrium was specialized on






















by (A7) and (A8) if in the specialized outsourcing equilibrium both the in-
tegrated and the outsourcing technology are in use. In contrast, if only





determined by (A5) and (A6), according to fact 2.
26Suppose withoutloss ofgenerality that …rms ofthe Y -intensive sector i are






























, according to de…nition 4 of
Z-outsourcingand the assumptionof nofactor intensity reversal for (wY;wZ) 2
Wi. Remember that ki







































= k, according to (A13). Consider …rst the case that both













Z being determined by (A7) and (A8)




















































































cannot be an equilibrium under cost-saving outsourcing since the outsourc-
ing sector i was active in the non-outsourcing equilibrium. Finally, since unit









Z is the only possible outcome if both f and g


















Z) ¸ p¡i. This concludes
the …rst step in the proof of part (ii).
Suppose next that …rms of the Y -intensive sector i are engaged in Y -






















f (wY ;wZ) (A14)
for all (wY ;wZ) 2 W i, since Y -outsourcing is assumed. If only the out-
sourcing technology is in use in the specialized outsourcing equilibrium, factor
prices are determined by (A5) and (A6). Then, in view of (A13) and (A14),










(Remember that the slope ¡
dwZ
dwYjci



























(A14), and the fact that ki
f is homogenous of degree zero in factor prices
wY;wZ.) Moreover, the fact that integrated technology (f) is no longer
























Z, which is identical with condition (A10). (A10)








Y is possible. This
completes the proof of theorem 4.¥
Specialized Non-outsourcing Equilibria and Factor Price
Implications of International Outsourcing
The following two tables summarize the real and relative factor price im-
plications of international outsourcing if the non-outsourcing equilibrium is
specialized and outsourcing occurs only within the Y -intensive sector. Table
2 gives the factor price implications if the Y -intensive sector was inactive in
28the non-outsourcing equilibrium.
>Table 2<
As in table 1 ”+” and ”¡” mean that international outsourcing has a
positive or negative impact on the respective real or relative factor price. A
”°” indicates that there is no change.
Table 3 gives the factor price implications if the Y -intensive sector was
active in the non-outsourcing equilibrium.
>Table 3<
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Figure 1: A diversified non-outsourcing equilibrium with sector i 
















f p w w c























f w w k ,
-
Figure 2: A diversified outsourcing equilibrium with firms of the Y-
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  wY  wZ  wY/wZ 
Theorem 1 (Diversified 
outsourcing equilibrium):  +  –  + 
Theorem 2 (Specialized 
outsourcing equilibrium):       
   Z-outsourcing
 1  +  +/O/–  + 
   Y-outsourcing       
      (a) f and g active  –  +  – 
      (b) g active
 2  +/O/–  +/O/–  +/O/– 
 
Table 1: Impacts of outsourcing of the Y-intensive sector if the 
non-outsourcing equilibrium is diversified 
______________ 






f > ,  and 
the assumption of Z-outsourcing. 






  wY  wZ  wY/wZ 
(1) Diversified outsourcing 
equilibrium:       
   Z-outsourcing  +  –  + 
   Y-outsourcing
 1  +/O/–  +/O/–  +/O/– 
(2) Specialization on the 
outsourcing sector:       
   Z-outsourcing
 2  +  +/O/–  + 
   Y-outsourcing       
      (a) f and g active  –  +  – 
      (b) g active
 3  +/O/–  +/O/–  +/O/– 
 
Table 2: Impacts of outsourcing of the Y-intensive sector if the 
non-outsourcing equilibrium is specialized on the Z-intensive sector. 
______________ 
1 One factor gains one factor loses. 
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- >  and the assumption of Z-outsourcing. 





  wY  wZ  wY/wZ 
(1) Diversified outsourcing 
equilibrium:  +  –  + 
(2) Specialization on the 
outsourcing sector:       
   Z-outsourcing       
      (a) f and g active  +  –  + 
      (b) g active
 1  +  +/O/–  + 
   Y-outsourcing       
      (a) f and g active  –  +  – 
      (b) g active
 2  +/O/–  +  – 
 
Table 3: Impacts of outsourcing of the Y-intensive sector if the 
non-outsourcing equilibrium is specialized on the Y-intensive sector. 
______________ 
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outsourcing. 
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outsourcing. 